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Lincoln argued in his debates with Douglas, a constitution based on 
interest is not a constitution of a free people. 
Constitutional scholarship, if it is to be serious scholarship, 
must be the scholarship of freedom. It must seek, above all, to elab-
orate the fundamental and permanent principles of the organic will 
of the people. The permanent principles of the Constitution must, 
of course, be adapted and applied in different ways in order to meet 
changing exigencies. But this adaptation and application does not 
alter or change the principles themselves. There must, therefore, be 
an element of statesmanship in constitutional studies if those studies 
are to serve constitutional government. But a scholarship that can-
not unashamedly serve the ends of constitutional government-
human freedom-does not deserve to be taken seriously. There is a 
real question as to whether the regnant scholarship of today de-
serves to be taken seriously. 
RODNEY A. SMOLLAn 
I got the Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo-ork 
Bye, Bye, Bye Centennial Blues .... 
-To Be Played Blues Style, Sung in a 
Bob Dylan Nasal Twang 
A distinguished professor of constitutional law, from one of the 
nation's best law schools, recently shared with me, in a candid mo-
ment over drinks at a conference, his thoughts on the current state 
of constitutional law scholarship. He was depressed about it, and 
he depressed me. I'm now in a constitutional crisis of my own. I 
suspect I was depressed primarily for two reasons: his diagnosis of 
the disease rang true, and I saw my own scholarship as dominated 
by its symptoms. 
So, I turn to my colleagues 
for what it's all about 
Please tell me, John Nowak, 
please lay it all out 
What were they really thinking, 
and why should we care? 
What should we be thinking, and 
where should we go from here? 
I got the Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo·ork 
Bye, Bye, Bye Centennial Blues! 
The discipline of constitutional law scholarship, it seems, has 
27. Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. 
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largely lost its discipline. And a discipline without discipline isn't 
one. The field is increasingly dominated by instrumentalists. When 
constitutional scholarship is unabashedly result-oriented, when 
reading a law review piece becomes indistinguishable from reading 
an amicus curiae brief (the citations are simply in footnotes instead 
of the text), the field loses its sense of inquiry. All feeling of strug-
gle is missing; from the first sentence the writer betrays no hint of 
doubt in his premises, and confidence builds inexorably with each 
conclusion. Does no one remember the admonitions of Holmes that 
"certitude is not the test of certainty," and that men have been 
"cock-sure of many things that were not so?" 
Raoul Berger says he knows 
what they basically had in mind, 
And because a deal's a deal, this 
thing is binding over time 
But if I eat Raoul's theory, I'll 
grow up to be Bruce Fein. 
I got the Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo-ork 
Bye, Bye. Bye Centennial Blues! 
How, if at all, is the professional role of the constitutional 
scholar different from that of the litigator or judge? The magnetic 
forces attracting the scholar toward becoming a lean, mean advo-
cacy machine increase exponentially with expertise, threatening to 
suck one's professional persona into a black hole of endless good 
causes. Bright, personable, and altruistic scholars, who believe pas-
sionately in using their craft to improve American life, become 
pseudo-scholars, sophisticated intellectual lobbyists in tweed coats 
and Volvos. 
Mark Tush net don't like nothin' 
that ain't tinged with Mr. Marx 
Karl, that is, not Groucho -
we're talk in' sit-ins in the parks 
Dick Howard's with Roger Mudd, Eleanor 
Holmes Norton he's a chid en:· 
She's chiden' him right back 
with lines she ripped off from 
Joe Riden. 
I got the Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo-ork 
Bye, Bye, Bye Centennial Blues 
If this description were merely accurate, it could inflict pain, 
but not depression. Depression is the product of futility, of not be-
ing able to perceive a way out. For to renounce advocacy is not 
easy, if it is possible at all. A litigator's life is stressful in its de-
56 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 1:17 
mands for performance, and in its persistent challenge to resist un-
ethical conduct, but it is at least free of intellectual guilt for 
preoccupation with result. Advocacy cannot be a sin when it is the 
whole point. 
Ollie is a macho nerd, 
He'll wrestle terrorists with calm 
While his lawyer screams at Inouye 
I'm not a potted palm! 
I got the Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo-ork 
Bye, Bye, Bye Centennial Blues 
The judge is spared much of the stress of daily abrasive battles, 
but is saddled with an endemic crisis of conscience: how is a trained 
advocate suddenly to become a trained neutral, and what does being 
neutral mean? It certainly should not mean staying "in the main-
stream," for as Learned Hand instructed in the T.J. Hooper, "a 
whole calling may have unduly lagged." It must instead mean de-
ciding cases through some mode of thought different, at least in de-
gree, from pure advocacy. It must refer to some sort of 
disinterested intellectual honesty-some veil of ignorance, disregard 
for consequences, some dispassionate obsession with principle. The 
president and members of Congress are supposed to have visions of 
America. The judge is not. The judge is to have a vision of law. 
Chief Justice Burger he resigned 
to take the Bicentennial job 
I'm surprised they gave it to him, I think 
Ted Koppel he got robbed. 
The marching band at half-time will 
now form Independence Hall 
While Ollie's shredding documents 
with Fawn Hall on the Washington Mall. 
I got the Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo-ork 
Bye, Bye, Bye Centennial Blues 
But this vision of the judge's role is pure myth, and the world is 
better for it. So what if they wear robes for the State of the Union 
address, while everyone else is in business suits. Judges are mostly 
men and women of affairs. They decide cases as practical people, 
mediating between the ideal and the mundane. How can results be 
totally ignored when the judge is paid to determine them? 
Georgie Washington ran the Convention 
With a hands-off management style 
So now we got the Iranian connection 
And a big Ronnie Reagan smile 
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I got the Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo-ork 
Bye. Bye, Bye Centennial Blues 
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But if the advocate and the judge know their jobs, what is the 
constitutional scholar's role to be? In ideal terms, at least in the 
ideal terms of my distinguished colleague, I suspect that the scholar 
is seen as the only actor in the drama with the luxury of true neu-
trality. His or her role is thus that of the nagging conscience, to be 
everything the judge is supposed to be in myth but can never be in 
practice. If the legal system is to be kept honest the scholar must be 
honest, and to be honest the scholar must be ruthlessly disciplined. 
But if constitutional scholarship is not to be advocacy, what is 
it to be? If one cares deeply about the central issues of American 
life, and if one recognizes that judicial rulings in constitutional cases 
profoundly affect that life, what is the constitutional scholar to do? 
The advocate at least has a provisional anchor in the end he or 
she seeks to accomplish, and the judge an anchor in the end that is 
accomplished. The neutral scholar, however, must search for safe 
moorings in some more transcendent fixture. But where? In logic? 
In the constitutional text? In history? In the collective aspirations 
of the people? Where am I supposed to find my discipline? What 
discipline tells me what discipline means? To give up instrumental-
ism seems to threaten the one sure compass I have, what I feel in 
my gut. Without it will scholarship be drained of force and mean-
ing? Will I be yet another yuppie without a cause? 
I got the Ed Meese, Warren Burger, Roscoe Pound, 
Alexander Bickel, Gerald Gunther, 
Larry Tribe, Fred Rodell, John Nowak, Ron Rotunda, 
Mark Tushnet, Richard Posner, Vincent Blasi, 
Henry Monaghan, Michael Perry, William Van Alstyne, 
Dan Farber, David Bryden, Jesse Choper, John Hart Ely. 
Bruce Ackerman, Richard Epstein, Ronald Dworkin, 
John Rawls, Abe Lincoln, Herbert Wechsler, 
Orval Faubus, Teddy Kennedy, Orrin Hatch, 
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, William Rehnquist, 
William Brennan, George Washington. Ronald Reagan 
Ollie No-orth 
Bob Bo-ork 
Bye. Bye. Bye Centennial Blues! 
DAVID M. O'BRIEN2s 
Two points about contemporary constitutional scholarship 
strike me as worth making. First, it has become heavily normative 
28. Professor of History, University of Virginia. 
